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The last 50 years have witnessed a dazzling array of social ethical revolutions
in Western society. Such moral movements as feminism, civil rights, environmentalism,
affirmative action, consumer advocacy, pro- and anti-abortion activism, homosexual rights,
children‘s rights, the student movement, antiwar activism, public rejection of biotechnology,
have forever changed the way governments and pubic institutions comport themselves. This
is equally true for private enterprise: to be successful, businesses must be seen as operating
solidly in harmony with changing and emerging social ethics. It is arguable that morally
based boycotting of South African business was instrumental in bringing about the end of
apartheid, and similar boycotting of some farm products in the U.S. led to significant
improvements in the living situations of farm workers. It is de rigeur for major corporations
to have reasonable numbers of minorities visibly peopling their ranks, and for liquor
companies to advertise on behalf of moderation in alcohol consumption. Cigarette
companies now press upon the public a message that cigarettes kill, and extol their
involvement in protecting battered women; and forestry and oil companies spend millions
(even billions) to persuade the public of their environmental commitments.
Not only is success tied to accord with social ethics but, even more fundamentally,
freedom and autonomy are as well. Every profession – be it medicine, law or agriculture – is
given freedom by the social ethic to pursue its aims. In return, society basically says to
professions it does not understand well enough to regulate, ―you regulate yourselves the way
we would regulate you if we understood what you do, which we don‘t. But we will know if
you don‘t self-regulate properly and then we will regulate you, despite our lack of
understanding.‖ For example, some years ago, Congress became concerned about excessive
use of antibiotic in animal feeds, and concluded that veterinarians were a major source of the
problem. As a result, Congress was about to ban extra-label drug use by veterinarians, a
move that would have killed veterinary medicine as we know it. However, through extensive
efforts to educate legislators, such legislation did not proceed to law.

One major social ethical concern that has developed over the last four decades is a
significant emphasis on the treatment of animals used by society for various purposes. It is
easy to demonstrate the degree to which these concerns have seized the public imagination.
According to both the U.S. National Cattlemen‘s Beef Association and the National Institutes
of Health (the latter being the source of funding for the majority of biomedical research in the
U.S.), both groups not inclined to exaggerate the influence of animal ethics, by the early
1990s Congress had been consistently receiving more letters, phone calls, faxes, e-mails and
personal contacts on animal-related issues than on any other topic ( McCarthy, 1988; NCBA,
1992).
Whereas 30 years ago one would have found no bills pending in the U.S. Congress
relating to animal welfare, recent years have witnessed dozens of such bills annually, with
2100 in 2004 at the state level. State laws have increasingly prevented the use of live or
dead shelter animals for biomedical research and training and have focused on myriad other
areas of animal welfare. Seventy percent of Colorado‘s population voted to end the spring
bear hunt by constitutional amendment (Denver Post, 1994). In Ontario, the environmental
minister stopped a similar hunt by executive fiat in response to social ethical concern
(Animal People, 1999). California abolished the hunting of mountain lions.
In fact, wildlife managers have worried, in academic journals, about ―management by
referendum‖ for humane reasons. According to the director of the American Quarter Horse
Association, the number of state bills related to horse welfare filled a telephone-book-sized
volume in 1998 alone (Houston, 1998). Public sentiment for equine welfare in California
carried a bill through the state legislature making the slaughter of horses or shipping of
horses for slaughter a felony in that state and the end of horse slaughter in the U.S. followed.
Even more dramatic, perhaps, is the worldwide proliferation of laws to protect
laboratory animals. In the United States, for example, two major pieces of legislation, which
I helped draft and defend before Congress, regulating and constraining the use and treatment
of animals in research were passed by the U.S. Congress in 1985, despite vigorous opposition
from the powerful biomedical research and medical lobbies (Animal Welfare Act; Health
Research Extension Act). This opposition included well-financed, highly visible
advertisements and media promotions indicating that human health and medical progress
would be harmed by implementation of such legislation. When I testified before Congress
on behalf of this law in 1982, a literature search in the Library of Congress turned up no
papers in the scientific literature on laboratory animal analgesia and only two on animal
analgesia, one of which said "there ought to be papers." Now my anesthesiology colleagues
tell me there are between 5 and 10 thousand, with a commensurate increase in use. Equally
important, these laws have undercut scientific ideology‘s unwillingness to acknowledge
animal thought and feeling (Rollin, 2006).
In 1986, Britain superseded its pioneering act of 1876 with new laws aimed at
strengthening public confidence in the welfare of experimental animals (Animal Legislation,
2003). Research on Great Apes has been truncated across the world.
Many animal uses seen as frivolous by the public have been abolished without
legislation. Toxicological testing of cosmetics on animals has been truncated; companies
such as the Body Shop have been wildly successful internationally by totally disavowing
such testing, and free-range egg production is a growth industry across the Western world.
Greyhound racing in the U.S. has declined, in part for animal welfare reasons, with the
Indiana veterinary community spearheading the effort to prevent greyhound racing from
coming into the state. Zoos that are little more than prisons for animals (the state of the art

during my youth) have all but disappeared, and the very existence of zoos is being
increasingly challenged, despite the public‘s unabashed love of seeing animals. And, as
Gaskell and his associates‘ work has revealed (Gaskell, et al., 1997), genetic engineering has
been rejected in Europe not, as commonly believed, for reasons of risk but for reasons of
ethics; in part for reasons of animal ethics. Similar reasons (i.e., fear of harming cattle) have,
in part, driven European rejection of bovine somatotropin (BST).
Inevitably, agriculture has felt the force of social concern with animal treatment –
indeed, it is arguable that contemporary concern in society with the treatment of farm
animals in modern production systems blazed the trail leading to a new ethic for animals. As
early as 1965, British society took notice of what the public saw as an alarming tendency to
industrialize animal agriculture by chartering the Brambell Commission, a group of scientists
under the leadership of Sir Rogers Brambell, who affirmed that any agricultural system
failing to meet the needs and natures of animals was morally unacceptable (Brambell,1965).
In 1988, the Swedish Parliament passed, virtually unopposed, what the New York Times
called a ―Bill of Rights‖ for farm animals, abolishing in Sweden, in a series of timed steps,
the confinement systems currently dominating North American agriculture (New York
Times, 1988). Much of northern Europe has followed suit, and the European Union is
moving in a similar direction, and sow stalls must be eliminated in by 2011 (EU, 2001).
Although the U.S. has been a latecomer to agricultural issues, things have moved
rapidly, with referenda pressed by HSUS abolishing sow stalls, battery cages, and veal crates
across the U.S. My own work attests to this tendency. In 2007, over two days of dialogue, I
convinced Smithfield Farms, the world's largest pork producer, to phase out gestation crates.
In 2008, the Pew Commission, on which I served as the advocate for farm animal welfare,
called for the end of high confinement animal agriculture within ten years, for reasons of
animal welfare, environmental despoliation, human and animal health, and social justice.
Most dramatically, I was able to broker an agreement between the Humane Society of the
United States and the Colorado Livestock Association passing a jointly sponsored farm
animal welfare law in Colorado in 2008, abolishing sow stalls and veal crates.
The agriculture community in the U.S. has been far behind societal concern. There is
one monumental conceptual error that is omnipresent in the agricultural industry‘s
discussions of animal welfare – an error of such magnitude that it trivializes the industry‘s
responses to ever-increasing societal concerns about the treatment of agricultural animals.
When one discusses farm animal welfare with industry groups or with the American
Veterinary Medical Association, one finds the same response – animal welfare is solely a
matter of ―sound science‖.
Those of us serving on the Pew Commission, better known as the National
Commission on Industrial Farm Animal Production, encountered this response regularly
during our dealings with industry representatives. This commission studied intensive animal
agriculture in the U.S. (Pew Trusts, 2008; pcifap.org). For example, one representative of the
Pork Producers, testifying before the Commission, answered that while people in her industry
were quite ―nervous‖ about the Commission, their anxiety would be allayed were we to base
all of our conclusions and recommendations on ―sound science‖. Hoping to rectify the error
in that comment, as well as educate the numerous industry representatives present, I
responded to her as follows: ―Madame, if we on the Commission were asking the question
of how to raise swine in confinement, science could certainly answer that question for us.
But that is not the question the Commission, or society, is asking. What we are asking is,

ought we raise swine in confinement? And to this question, science is not relevant‖. Judging
by her ―huh‖, I assume I did not make my point.
Questions of animal welfare are at least partly ―ought‖ questions, questions of ethical
obligation. The concept of animal welfare is an ethical concept to which, once understood,
science brings relevant data. When we ask about an animal‘s welfare, or about a person‘s
welfare, we are asking about what we owe the animal, and to what extent. When a document
called the CAST report, first published by U.S. Agricultural scientists in the early 1980‘s,
discussed animal welfare, it affirmed that the necessary and sufficient conditions for
attributing positive welfare to an animal were represented by the animals‘ productivity. A
productive animal enjoyed positive welfare; a non-productive animal enjoyed poor welfare
(CAST, 1981).
This notion was fraught with many difficulties. First of all, productivity is an
economic notion predicated of a whole operation; welfare is predicated of individual animals.
An operation, such as caged laying hens may be quite profitable if the cages are severely
over crowded yet the individual hens do not enjoy good welfare. Second, equating
productivity and welfare is, to some significant extent, legitimate under husbandry
conditions, where the producer does well if and only if the animals do well, and square pegs,
as it were, are fitted into square holes with as little friction as possible (as when pigs live
outside). Under industrial conditions, however, animals do not naturally fit in the niche or
environment in which they are kept, and are subjected to ―technological sanders‖ that allow
for producers to force square pegs into round holes – antibiotics, feed additives, hormones,
air handling systems – so the animals do not die and produce more and more kilograms of
meat or milk. Without these technologies, the animals could not be productive.
The key point to recall here is that even if the CAST Report definition of animal
welfare did not suffer from the difficulties we outlined, it is still an ethical concept. It
essentially says ―what we owe animals and to what extent is simply what it takes to get them
to create profit‖. This in turn would imply that the animals are well-off if they have only
food, water, and shelter, something the industry has sometimes asserted. Even in the early
80‘s, however, there were animal advocates and others who would take a very different
ethical stance on what we owe farm animals. Indeed, the famous five freedoms articulated in
Britain by the Farm Animal Welfare Council during the 1970‘s (even before the CAST
Report) represents quite a different ethical view of what we owe animals, when it affirms
that:
The welfare of an animal includes its physical and mental state and we
consider that good animal welfare implies both fitness and a sense of wellbeing. Any animal kept by man, must at least, be protected from unnecessary
suffering.
We believe that an animal‘s welfare, whether on farm, in transit, at market or
at a place of slaughter should be considered in terms of ‘five freedoms’ (see
www.fawc.org.uk).
1. Freedom from Hunger and Thirst
2. Freedom from Discomfort
3. Freedom from Pain, Injury or Disease
4. Freedom to Express Normal Behavior
5. Freedom from Fear and Distress

Clearly there is an indefinite number of other definitions). Which is correct, of
course, cannot be decided by gathering facts or doing experiments – indeed which ethical
framework one adopts will in fact determine the shape of science studying animal welfare.
To clarify: suppose you hold the view that an animal is well-off when it is productive,
as per the CAST Report. The role of your welfare science in this case will be to study what
feed, bedding, temperature, etc. are most efficient at producing the most meat, milk, or eggs
for the least money – much what animal and veterinary science does today. On the other
hand, if you take the FAWC view of welfare, your efficiency will be constrained by the need
to acknowledge the animal‘s natural behavior and mental state, and to assure that there is
minimal pain, fear, distress and discomfort – not factors in the CAST view of welfare unless
they have a negative impact on economic productivity. Thus, in a real sense, sound science
does not determine your concept of welfare; rather, your concept of welfare determines what
counts as sound science!
The failure to recognize the inescapable ethical component in the concept of animal
welfare leads inexorably to those holding different ethical views talking past each other.
Thus, producers ignore questions of animal suffering not affecting production. Animal
advocates, on the other hand, give such factors primacy, and are totally unimpressed with
how efficient or productive the system may be.
A major question obviously arises here. If the notion of animal welfare is inseparable
from ethical components, and people‘s ethical stance on obligations to farm animals differ
markedly across a highly diverse spectrum, whose ethic is to predominate and define, in law
or regulation, what counts as ―animal welfare‖? It is to this issue we now turn.
What is the nature of the emerging new ethical thinking that underlies and informs the
dramatic social changes just discussed? Although society has always had an articulated ethic
regarding animal treatment, that ethic has been very minimalistic, leaving most of the issue
of animal treatment to people‘s personal ethic, rather than to the social ethic. Since Biblical
times, that limited social ethic has forbidden deliberate, willful, sadistic, deviant, purposeless,
unnecessary infliction of pain and suffering on animals, or outrageous neglect, such as not
feeding or watering. Beginning in the early nineteenth century, this set of prohibitions was
articulated in the anti-cruelty statutes of the laws in all civilized societies (Leavitt, 1978).
But even in Biblical and medieval times, the social ethic inveighed against cruelty. The Old
Testament injunctions against yoking an ox and an ass together to a plow, or muzzling the ox
when it is being used to mill grain, or seething a calf in its mother‘s milk, all reflect concern
with, and abhorrence for what the Rabbinical tradition called tsaar baalei chaiim; the
suffering of living things. In the Middle Ages, St. Thomas Aquinas (Aquinas, 1956), while
affirming that, lacking a soul, animals enjoyed no moral status, nonetheless strictly forbade
cruelty, on the grounds that permitting such behavior towards animals would encourage its
spreading to human beings, an insight buttressed by over two decades of recent research
(Ascione, e. al., 1999). Numerous serial killers have evidenced early abusive behavior
towards animals, as have many of the youths in the U.S. who in recent years wrought
massacres on their peers.
For the overwhelming majority of human history, until some four decades ago, the
anti-cruelty ethic served as the only socially articulated moral principle for animal treatment.
Except for a few sporadic voices following in the wake of Darwin‘s articulation of humananimal continuity, no one spoke of animals‘ rights, nor did society have moral concepts for
animal treatment that went ―beyond cruelty.‖ The obvious question that presents itself is
this: What has occurred during the last half century which led to social disaffection with the

venerable ethic of anti-cruelty and to strengthening of the anti-cruelty laws, which now make
cruelty a felony in almost 40 states.
In a study commissioned by USDA to answer this question, I distinguished a variety
of social and conceptual reasons (Rollin, 1995):
1) Changing demographics and consequent changes in the paradigm for animals:
Whereas at the turn of the century, more than half the population was engaged in
producing food for the rest, today only some 1.5% of the U.S. public is engaged in
production agriculture (AMC, 2003). One hundred years ago, if one were to ask a person in
the street, urban or rural, to state the words that come into their mind when one says
―animal‖, the answer would doubtless have been ―horse‖, ―cow‖, ―food‖, ―work‖, etc.
Today, however, for the majority of the population, the answer is ―dog‖, ―cat‖, ―pet‖.
2) We have lived through a long period of ethical soul-searching
For almost 50 years society has turned its ―ethical searchlight‖ on humans
traditionally ignored or even oppressed by the consensus ethic – blacks, women, the
handicapped, other minorities. The same ethical imperative has focused attention on our
treatment of the non-human world – the environment and animals.
3) The media has discovered that ―animals sell papers‖
One cannot channel-surf across normal television service without being bombarded
with animal stories, real and fictional. (A New York Times reporter recently told me that
more time on cable TV in New York City is devoted to animals than to any other subject.)
Recall, for example, the extensive media coverage a decade ago of some whales trapped in
an ice-floe, and freed by a Russian ice-breaker. This was hardly an overflowing of Russian
compassion – an oxymoronic notion applied to a people who gave us pogroms, the Gulag,
and Stalinism. Rather, someone in the Kremlin was bright enough to realize that liberating
the whales was an extremely cheap way to score points with U.S. public opinion.
4) Strong and visible arguments have been advanced in favor of raising the status of animals
by philosophers, scientists and celebrities (Singer, 1975; Rollin, 1981; Regan, 1983;
Sapontzis, 1987).
5) Changes in the nature of animal use demanded new moral categories
In my view, while all of the reasons listed above are relevant, they are nowhere nearly
as important as the precipitous and dramatic changes in animal use that occurred after World
War II. These changes were, first of all, huge conceptual changes in the nature of agriculture
and second the rise of significant amounts of animal research and testing.
For virtually all of human history, animal agriculture was based foursquare in animal
husbandry. Husbandry, derived from the old Norse word ―hus/band,‖ bonded to the
household, meant taking great pains to put one‘s animals into the best possible environment
one could find to meet their physical and psychological natures which, following Aristotle, I
call telos(Rollin, 1992), and then augmenting their ability to survive and thrive by providing
them with food during famine, protection from predation, water during drought, medical
attention, help in birthing, and so on. Thus traditional agriculture was roughly a fair contract
between humans and animals, with both sides being better off in virtue of the relationship.
Husbandry agriculture was about putting square pegs into square holes, round pegs into
round holes, and creating as little friction as possible doing so. So powerful is the notion of
husbandry, in fact, that when the Psalmist seeks a metaphor for God‘s ideal relationship to
humans, he seizes upon the shepherd in the 23rd Psalm:
The Lord is my shepherd; I shall not want; He maketh me to lie down in green
pastures; He leadeth me beside still waters; He restoreth my soul.

We wish no more from God than what the husbandman provides for his sheep. In husbandry,
a producer did well if and only if the animals did well, so productivity was tied to welfare.
No social ethic was thus needed to ensure proper animal treatment; only the anti-cruelty
designed to deal with sadists and psychopaths was needed to augment husbandry. Selfinterest virtually assured good treatment.
After World War II, this beautiful contract was broken by humans. Symbolically, at
universities, Departments of Animal Husbandry became Departments of Animal Science,
defined not as care, but as ―the application of industrial methods to the production of
animals‖ to increase efficiency and productivity. With ―technological sanders‖ – hormones,
vaccines, antibiotics, air-handling systems, mechanization – we could force square pegs into
round holes, and place animals into environments where they suffered in ways irrelevant to
productivity. If a nineteenth century agriculturalist had tried to put 100,000 egg-laying hens
in cages in a building, they all would have died of disease in a month; today such systems
dominate.
The new approach to animal agriculture was not the result of cruelty, bad character or
even insensitivity. It developed rather out of perfectly decent, prima facie plausible motives
that were a product of dramatic significant historical and social upheavals that occurred after
World War II. At that point in time, agricultural scientists and government officials became
extremely concerned about supplying the public with cheap and plentiful food for a variety of
reasons. In the first place, after the Dust Bowl and the Great Depression, many people in the
U.S. had soured on farming. Second, reasonable predictions of urban and suburban
encroachment on agricultural land were being made, with a resultant diminution of land for
food production. Third, many farm people had been sent to both foreign and domestic urban
centers during the war, thereby creating a reluctance to return to rural areas that lacked
excitement; recall the song of the 40‘s ―How are you gonna keep ‗em down on the farm now
that they‘ve seen Paree?‖ Fourth, having experienced the spectre of literal starvation during
the Great Depression, the American consumer was, for the first time in history, fearful of an
insufficient food supply. Fifth, projection of major population increases further fueled
concern.
When the above considerations of loss of land and diminution of agricultural labor
are coupled with the rapid development of a variety of technological modalities relevant to
agriculture during and after World Was II and with the burgeoning belief in technologicallybased economics of scale, it was probably inevitable that animal agriculture would be come
subject to industrialization. This was a major departure from traditional agriculture and a
fundamental change in agricultural core values – industrial values of efficiency and
productivity replaced and eclipsed the traditional values of ―way of life‖ and husbandry.
One of my colleagues, a cow-calf cattle specialist, says that the worst thing that ever
happened to his department is betokened by the name change from Animal Husbandry to
Animal Science. No husbandry person would ever dream of feeding sheep meal, poultry
waste, or cement dust to cattle, but such ―innovations‖ are entailed by an industrial/efficiency
mind-set.
In addition, in the mid-twentieth century there arose large scale use of animals in
research and testing for toxicity. This too was an unprecedented large-scale use of animals,
lacking the fairness of husbandry agriculture.
A moment‘s reflection on the development of large-scale animal research and hightechnology agriculture elucidates why these innovations have led to the demand for a new

ethic for animals in society. In a nutshell, these new developments represent a radically
different playing field of animal use from the one that characterized most of human history;
in the modern world of agriculture and animal research, the traditional anti-cruelty ethic
grows increasingly less applicable. A thought experiment makes this clear. Imagine a pie
chart that represents all the suffering that animals experience at human hands today. What
percentage of that suffering is a result of intentional cruelty of the sort condemned by the
anticruelty ethic and laws? When I ask my audiences this question—whether scientists,
agriculturalists, animal advocates, or members of the general public—I always get the same
response: only a fraction of 1 percent. Few people have ever witnessed overt, intentional
cruelty, which is thankfully rare.
On the other hand, people realize that biomedical and other scientific research,
toxicological safety testing, uses of animals in teaching, pharmaceutical product extraction
from animals, and so on all produce far more suffering than does overt cruelty. This
suffering comes from creating disease, burns, trauma, fractures, and the like in animals in
order to study them; producing pain, fear, learned helplessness, aggression, and other states
for research; poisoning animals to study toxicity; and performing surgery on animals to
develop new operative procedures. In addition, suffering is engendered by the unnatural
housing of research animals.
Now it is clear that farmers and researchers are not intentionally cruel—they are
motivated by plausible and decent intentions: to cure disease, advance knowledge, ensure
product safety, provide cheap and plentiful food. Nonetheless, they may inflict great
amounts of suffering on the animals they use. Furthermore, the traditional ethic of anticruelty and the laws expressing it had no vocabulary for labeling such suffering, since
researchers were not maliciously intending to hurt the animals. Indeed, this is eloquently
marked by the fact that the cruelty laws exempt animal use in science and standard
agricultural practices from their purview. Therefore, a new set of concepts beyond cruelty
and kindness was needed to discuss the issues associated with burgeoning research animal
use and industrial agriculture.
Society eventually became aware that new kinds of suffering were engendered
by modern agriculture. Once again, producers could not be categorized as cruel, yet they
were responsible for new types of animal suffering on at least four fronts:
1.
Production diseases arise from the new ways the animals are produced. For
example, liver abscesses in cattle are a function of certain animals‘ responses to the
high-concentrate, low-roughage diet that characterizes feedlot production. Although
a certain percentage of the animals get sick and die, the overall economic efficiency
of feedlots is maximized by the provision of such a diet. The ideas of a method of
production creating diseases that were ―acceptable‖ would be anathema to a
husbandry agriculturalist.
2.
The huge scale of industrialized agricultural operations and the small profit
margin per animal militate against the sort of individual attention that typified much
of traditional agriculture.
3.
Another new source of suffering in industrialized agriculture results from
physical and psychological deprivation for animals in confinement: lack of space,
lack of companionship for social animals, inability to move freely, boredom, austerity
of environments, and so on. Since the animals evolved for adaptation to extensive
environments but are now placed in truncated environments, such deprivation is
inevitable.

4.
In confinement systems, workers may not be ―animal smart‖; the
―intelligence,‖ such as it is, is in the mechanized system. Instead of husbandmen,
workers in swine factories are minimum wage, often animal-ignorant labor. So there
is often no empathy with, or concern for, the animals.
These sources of suffering, like the ones in research, are again not captured by the
vocabulary of cruelty, nor are they proscribed or even acknowledged by the laws based on
the anti-cruelty ethic. Furthermore, they typically do not arise under traditional agriculture
and its ethic of husbandry.
A few years ago, I experienced some sharply contracting incidents which
dramatically highlight the moral difference between intensive and extensive agriculture.
That particular year, Colorado cattle ranchers, paradigmatic exemplars of husbandry, were
afflicted by a significant amount of scours. Over two months, I talked to a half dozen
rancher friends of mine. Every single one had experienced trouble with scours, and every
one had spent more on treating the disease than was economically justified by the calves‘
monetary value. When I asked these men why they were being what an economist would
term ―economically irrational,‖ they were quite adamant in their response: ―It‘s part of my
bargain with the animal; part of caring for them,‖ one of them said.
It is, of course, the same ethical outlook that leads ranch wives to sit up all night with
sick marginal calves, sometimes for days in a row. If the issues were strictly economic, these
people would hardly be valuing their time at 50¢ per hour—including their sleep time!
Now in contrast to these uplifting moral attitudes, consider the following: One of my
animal scientist colleagues related to me that his son-in-law was an employee in a large, total
confinement swine operation. As a young man he had raised and shown pigs, keeping them
semi-extensively. One day he detected a disease among the feeder pigs in the confinement
facility where he works, which necessitated killing them with a blow to the head, since this
operation did not treat individual animals, their profit margin being allegedly too low. Out of
his long established husbandry ethic, he came in on his own time with his own medicine to
treat the animals. He cured them! Management‘s response was to fire him on the spot for
violating company policy! He kept his job and escaped with a reprimand only when he was
able to prove that he had expended his own—not the company‘s—resources. He continued
to work for them for a short time, but quit saying ―this ain‘t agriculture. The above-detailed
contrasting incidents, better than anything else I know, eloquently illustrate the large gap
between the ethics of husbandry and industry. (Many confinement operations are run by
accountants, not by animal science or animal husbandry people.)
Given that the old anti-cruelty ethic did not apply to animal research or
confinement agriculture, society needed new ethical concepts to express its concern about
these new uses. But ethical concepts do not arise ex nihilo.
Plato taught us a very valuable lesson about effecting ethical change. If one
wishes to change another person‘s – or society‘s – ethical beliefs, it is much better to remind
than to teach or, in my martial arts metaphor, to use judo rather than sumo. In other words, if
you and I disagree ethically on some matter, it is far better for me to show you that what I am
trying to convince you of is already implicit – albeit unnoticed – in what you already believe.
Similarly, we cannot force others to believe as we do (sumo); we can, however, show them
that their own assumptions, if thought through, lead to a conclusion different from what they
currently entertain (judo). These points are well-exemplified in 20th century U.S. history.
Prohibition was sumo, not judo – an attempt to forcefully impose a new ethic about drinking
on the majority by the minority. As such, it was doomed to fail, and in fact people drank

more during Prohibition. Contrast this with Lyndon Johnson‘s civil rights legislation. As
himself a Southerner, Johnson realized that even Southerners would acquiesce to the
following two propositions:
All humans should be treated equally,
and black people were human—they just had never bothered to draw the relevant
conclusion.
If Johnson had been wrong about this point, if ―writing this large‖ in the law had not
―reminded‖ people, civil rights would have been as ineffective as Prohibition!
So society was faced with the need for new moral categories and laws that reflect
those categories in order to deal with animal use in science and agriculture and to limit the
animal suffering with which it is increasingly concerned. At the same time, recall that
western society has one through almost fifty years of extending its moral categories for
humans to people who were morally ignored or invisible --- women, minorities, the
handicapped, children, citizens of the third world. As we noted earlier, new and viable ethics
do not emerge ex nihilo. So a plausible and obvious move is for society to continue in its
tendency and attempt to extend the moral machinery it has developed for dealing with
people, appropriately modified, to animals. And this is precisely what has occurred. Society
has taken elements of the moral categories it uses for assessing the treatment of people and is
in the process of modifying these concepts to make them appropriate for dealing with new
issues in the treatment of animals, especially their use in science and confinement
agriculture.
What aspect of our ethic for people is being so extended? One that is, in fact, quite
applicable to animal use, is the fundamental problem of weighing the interests of the
individual against those of the general welfare. Different societies have provided different
answers to this problem. Totalitarian societies opt to devote little concern to the individual,
favoring instead the state, or whatever their version of the general welfare may be. At the
other extreme, anarchical groups such as communes give primacy to the individual and very
little concern to the group – hence they tend to enjoy only transient existence. In our society,
however, a balance is struck. Although most of our decisions are made to the benefit of the
general welfare, fences are built around individuals to protect their fundamental interests
from being sacrificed to the majority. Thus we protect individuals from being silenced even
if the majority disapproves of what they say; we protect individuals from having their
property seized without recompense even if such seizure benefits the general welfare; we
protect individuals from torture even if they have planted a bomb in an elementary school
and refuse to divulge its location. We protect those interests of the individual that we
consider essential to being human, to human nature, from being submerged, even by the
common good. Those moral/legal fences that so protect the individual human are called
rights and are based on plausible assumptions regarding what is essential to being human.
It is this notion to which society in general is looking in order to generate the new
moral notions necessary to talk about the treatment of animals in today‘s world, where
cruelty is not the major problem but where such laudable, general human welfare goals as
efficiency, productivity, knowledge, medical progress, and product safety are responsible for
the vast majority of animal suffering. People in society are seeking to ―build fences‖ around
animals to protect the animals and their interests and natures from being totally submerged
for the sake of the general welfare, and are trying to accomplish this goal by going to the
legislature. In husbandry, this occurred automatically; in industrialized agriculture, where it
is no longer automatic, people wish to see it legislated.

Animals have natures of their own and interests that flow from these natures, and the
thwarting of these interests matters to animals as much as the thwarting of speech matters to
humans. The agenda is preserving the common-sense insight that ―fish gotta swim and birds
gotta fly,‖ and suffer if they don‘t.
This new ethic is conservative, not radical, harking back to the animal use that
necessitated and thus entailed respect for the animals‘ natures. It is based on the insight that
what we do to animals matters to them, just as what we do to humans matters to them, and
that consequently we should respect that mattering in our treatment of use of animals as we
do in our treatment and use of humans. And since respect for animal nature is no longer
automatic as it was in traditional husbandry agriculture, society is demanding that it be
encoded in law.
With regards to animal agriculture, the pastoral images of animals grazing on pasture
and moving freely are iconic. As the 23rd Psalm indicates, people who consume animals
wish to see the animals live decent lives, not lives of pain, distress and frustration. It is for
this reason in part that industrial agriculture conceals the reality of its practices from a naïve
public – witness Perdue‘s advertisements about raising ―happy chickens‖, or the California
―happy cow‖ ads. As ordinary people discover the truth, they are shocked.
Just as our use of people is constrained by respect for the basic elements of human
nature, people wish to see a similar notion applied to animals. Animals, too, have natures,
what I call telos following Aristotle – the ―pigness of the pig‖, the ―cowness of a cow‖. Pigs
are ―designed‖ to move about on soft loam, not to be in gestation crates. If this no longer
occurs naturally, as it did in husbandry, people wish to see it legislated. This is the
mainstream sense of ―animal rights‖.
As property, strictly speaking, animals cannot have legal rights. But a functional equivalent
to rights can be achieved by limiting property rights. When I and others drafted the U.S.
federal laws for laboratory animals, we did not deny that research animals were the property
of researchers. We merely placed limits on their use of their property. Similarly, our law
states that if one hurts an animal in research, one must control pain and distress. Thus
research animals can be said to have the right to have their pain controlled.
In the case of farm animals, people wish to see their basic needs and nature, teloi,
respected in the systems that they are raised. Since this no longer occurs naturally as it did in
husbandry, it must be imposed by legislation or regulation. A Gallup poll conducted in 2003
shows that 75% of the public wants legislated guarantees of farm animal welfare. This is
what I call ―animal rights as a mainstream phenomenon‖. Legal codification of rules of
animal care respecting animal telos is thus the form animal welfare takes where husbandry
has been abandoned.
Thus, in today‘s world, the ethical component of animal welfare prescribes that the
way we raise and use animals must embody respect and provision for their psychological
needs and natures. It is therefore essential that industrial agriculture phase out those systems
which cause animal suffering by violating animals‘ natures and replace them with systems
respecting their natures.
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